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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE, : 
dba B & B PLAZA, INC., 
: Civi1 No. 860402 
PIaint i ffs/Appel1 ants,: 
vs. : 
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, INC. , : 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED QN APPEAL 
Whether the Trial Court's decision dismissing Plaintiffs1 
Complaint on the basis that the cause of action was beyond the 
applicable statute of limitations was in error. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In this proceeding, Plaintiffs sought damages against the 
Defendant for the improper manufacture, production and supply of 
concrete used in the design and construction of storage units. 
The action was brought within the statutory time pursuant to 
78-12-25.5 Utah Cod 
Motion to Dismiss, 
e Annotated, (1953). The Defendant filed a 
based upon the statute of limitations period 
contained in 70(a)-2-725, Utah Code Annotated, on the basis that 
this was a sale of goods. 
Following a hearing and submission of Memorandums, the 
Court, on June 16, 1986, dismissed Plaintiffs1 Complaint with 
1 
prejud ice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs request that this Court reverse the decision of 
the Trial Court and allow the matter to proceed to trial on the 
me r i t s. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In 1978, the Plaintiffs, as individuals, initiated a 
business known as the B & B Plaza in Garden City, Rich County, 
State of Utah. As part of their anticipated business, they 
caused to be constructed, concrete and metal storage units for 
the purpose of renting individual units for storing boats and 
other recreational items for people who were visiting the Bear 
Lake area. (See Record, Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss) 
The Plaintiffs desired to have concrete footings and floors 
for the base of said storage units and for this purpose, 
contacted the Defendant. Plaintiffs were advised by the 
Defendant that it could provide the concrete and pour the same 
for Plaintiffs1 purposes. 
The Plaintiffs had no specific knowledge as to the type of 
concrete required, but left that decision to the Defendant. The 
Defendant manufactured the concrete, supplied it to the site and 
poured the concrete. The construction was completed in early 
1979. 
Shortly after said construction, the Spring of 1979, the 
concrete began to crack and show other signs of damage, so that 
2 
eventually the storage units became unusable. The doors would 
not close properly. The walls and foundation separated and the 
Plaintiffs lost money from the inability to rent said units, in 
addition to having their property suffer damage and waste, 
because of the alleged improper concrete. (See Record, Affidavit 
of Billie J. Cottle and Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss) 
The Plaintiffs filed their action in November of 1985 for 
recovery, pursuant to Section 78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated, 
which provides a seven (7) year statute of limitations for 
actions alleging defective design. 
In May of 1986, without any discovery having been taken, but 
simply after the filing of the Complaint and Answer, the 
Defendant moved for Summary Judgment on the basis that 
Plaintiffs' action was really a sale of goods, pursuant to 
Section 70(a)-2-725, Utah Code Annotated, (1953), which required 
that an action be brought for breach of such a sale within four 
(4) years. Plaintiffs' action was brought some six and one-half 
(6 1/2) years after the completion of construction and therefore, 
the Defendant's argued was beyond the statute of limitations. 
The Court received Memoranda from the parties and after 
hearing arguments on June 2, 1986, determined that the four (4) 
year statute of limitations was applicable and dismissed the case 
on June 16, 1986. This appeal was taken from that decision. 
SUvMARY OF THE ARGUvENT 
The Trial Court erred in applying the four (4) year statute 
3 
of limitations, rather than the seven (7) year statute of 
limitations and the case should be remanded for trial based upon 
the seven (7) year statute of limitations period, 
ARGUMENT 
This case poses a question which has not been specifically 
addressed by this Court before. 
Because this matter was denied by a Motion to Dismiss the 
only pleadings before this Court are the Complaint, Answer, 
Memorandums and Affidavits. No other discovery, Depositions, 
Interrogatories, etc., were taken and no evidentiary hearing was 
held on the merits. This Court is forced therefore, based upon 
those meager facts, to consider the applicability of two (2) 
periods of limitation to this situation and determine which is 
the proper statutory period in order to resolve this appeal. 
There is no question that this case is a case of both of the 
sale of goods and of defective construction. The Defendant was 
in the business of manufacturing concrete. The Plaintiffs, for 
business purposes, desired to utilize the concrete to construct 
storage units. In furtherance of that purpose they contracted 
with the Defendant for the purchase of concrete. 
That the type of mix, number of bags, the water to be used 
and those types of decisions which may be different, depending on 
the particular use of the concrete were left to the Defendant. 
In this case, the Plaintiffs1 purchased the concrete from 
the Defendant and therefore, it was, as Defendant alleged, a sale 
of goods and could be viewed as falling within the four (4) year 
4 
period pursuant to Section 70(a)-2-725. However, this is not a 
case where Plaintiffs just simply purchased the concrete, picked 
it up and then, themselves, exercised control over the concrete, 
poured it and utilized it in the construction of their units. 
This work was also accomplished by the Defendant. The Defendant 
poured the concrete, it provided the forms, it formed the floor 
and walls of the storage units and in fact, handled all the 
construction. Therefore, the Defendant not only manufactured (or 
designed) the product, but also constructed, with its product the 
ut1imate structure. 
Following the completion of construction, Plaintiffs allege 
that the construction was defective. This is clearly actionable 
pursuant to Section 78-12-25.5, which provides for a seven (7) 
year statute of limitations. 
The facts at the time of the Motion to Dismiss show that 
construction was completed by the Spring of 1979. This action 
was filed in November of 1985, clearly beyond the four (4) year 
statute of limitation period, but within the seven (7) year 
statute of limitation period. 
The case then is very simple. The Defendant's Motion 
focused on the four (4) year statute of limitation. Judge 
Christofferson apparently accepted that argument, but also 
referred to the seven (7) year period, indicating that the action 
was not instituted until seven (7) years after the sale of the 
concrete and delivery of the same to the site. Ke therefore, 
clearly found, that the governing theory or gravamen of this 
5 
lawsuit was a sale of goods, rather than a construction or design 
defect. 
In addressing first from what action the calculation of the 
applicable time period should be made. It is apparent that the 
four (4) year period for the sale of goods runs from the date of 
the actual sale. The Judge seemed to be saying however, that if 
in fact the seven (7) year period was applicable, (which he found 
it was not) it would run also from the sale and delivery of the 
goods, since this was in fact, a sale of goods situation. 
This is contrary to this Court's previous ruling in the case 
of Hooper Water Improvement District v. John O. Reeve, 642 P.2d 
745 (Utah 1982) in which the Court, in a case wherein damage was 
alleged because of construction and improvements to property 
which did fall within the seven (7) year period, that the period 
ran from the comp let ion of construction, not at the inception of 
construction or from the delivery of various construction items. 
In this case, Plaintiffs allege completion of construction 
in the Spring of 1979 and in fact, the suit was filed within the 
seven (7) year period from that time. 
Plaintiffs concede however, that although the Court 
discussed this matter, the real focus was on whether or not this 
was four (4) year or seven (7) year period. Plaintiffs submit 
that although the Courts of this jurisdiction has not made a 
specific ruling, that the Courts of other jurisdiction, including 
States within the Tenth Circuit, have consistently ruled that if 
two conflicting periods of limitation apply to the same facts 
6 
situation, that the longer statute should be the applicable 
statute. 
In Shew v. Coombay Loafers, 455 P.2d 359 (Washington 1969), 
a Washington Supreme Court case the Court specifically held that, 
11
 If it is questionable which of two statute 
of limitations apply, the rule is that the 
statute applying the longest period is 
generally used." 
This same logic was reiterated in a Hawaii decision, 
Au v. Au, 626 P.2d 173 (Hawaii 1981), where the Court in the 
following language indicates 
"However, where two or more causes of action 
arise from a single transaction, different 
statute of limitations are applicable to each 
of the separate claims. In addition, Courts 
will apply the longer limitations period when 
there is doubt as to which statute it 
applies." (Id at 182) 
Finally, the Courts attention is directed to a Montana case, 
Thiel v. Taurus Dri11ing, 710 P.2d, 33 (Montana 1985), in which 
the Court again cites the general proposition that 
"Where there is a substantial question as to 
which of two or more statutes of limitations 
should apply, the general rule is that doubt 
should be resolved in favor of the statute 
containing the longest limitation." 
There is no question in this case that the fact situation 
gives rise to two (2) separate claims: A claim for breach of 
warranty or implied fitness for purpose from the sale of goods 
and also for design and construction defects. 
There is also no question that two (2) limitation periods 
apply. That being four (4) years and seven (7) years. 
Finally, there is no question that the action was filed 
7 
within the seven (7) year period. Based upon the status of the 
record at the time of the Motion to Dismiss, the Court should 
have applied the longer statutory period and allowed the 
Plaintiffs to continue with their litigation. 
The failure to do so v/as error on the Court's part and 
should be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
It is well settled that where there are two (2) conflicting 
periods of limitation, the longer period should be applied. In 
this case, Plaintiffs1 claim was filed within a seven (7) year 
per iod. 
That both periods under the facts of the case could be 
applicable and therefore, the District Court erred in not 
applying the longer period. 
It is respectfully requested that this Court reverse the 
decision of the lower Court and remand the case for continued 
proceedings consistent with allowing the litigation to proceed to 
a trial on the merits. . An 
RESPECTFULLY SUHVIITTED this / M l a y of September, 1987. 
8 
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78-12-25.5 JUDICIAL CODE 
back overcharge for public u t i l i ty service, 
108 A. L. R. 751. 
When s ta tu te begins to run against ac-
tion to iccovor upon cont rac t paynblo in 
iiiHlulJmonlH, 8:3 A. L. It. 310. 
When s ta tu te commences to run against 
action for breach of w a r r a n t y on sale of 
chattels , 75 A. L. R. 1086. 
When s ta tu te of l imita t ions begins to 
run against action for loss of service or 
consortium, 173 A. L. It. 750. 
When s ta tu te of l imi ta t ions begins to 
run against action on a contract which 
contemplates an actual demand, 159 A. L. 
R. 1021. 
His tory : C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted b y 
L. 1967, ch. 218, § 1. 
Tit le of Act . 
An act enact ing a new section 78-12-25.5 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, re la t ing to the 
l imitat ions of actions by provid ing a t ime 
limit within which act ions for in jury to 
proper ty or death must be brought aga ins t 
persons who performed or furnished the 
When s ta tu te of l imitat ions commences 
to run against action by a t to rney em-
ployed on contingent foe who was dis-
olmrgod or willidi ow bof'oio doloi niimition 
of l i t igation or oilier event on which his 
compensation was contingent , 118 A. L. It. 
1281. 
When s ta tu te of l imitat ions commences 
1o run against nn action based on breach 
of duty by recording officer, 110 A. L. R. 
1067. 
When s ta tu te of l imitat ions commences 
to run against claim for contr ibut ion or 
indemnity based on tort , 57 A. L. It . 3d 
867. 
Constitutionality. 
Seven-year l imitation is applicable to 
the owner or t enan t in possession a t time 
of construction, or to their successors; 
those in possession and control of real ty 
have a continuing duly to make repairs, 
and should discover any faul t in construc-
tion within seven years ; claim t h a t the 
s ta tu te is unconsti tutional is wi thout merit . 
Good v nh-ri*4-~ <--
78-12-25.5. In jury due to defective design or construction of improve-
ment to real property—Within seven years.—No action to recover damages 
for any injury to property, real or personal, or for any injury to the per-
son, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and 
unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, nor any action for 
damages sustained on account of such injury, shall be brought against any 
person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision of con-
struction or construction of such improvement to real property more than 
seven years after the completion of construction. 
(1) "Person" shall mean an individual, corporation, partnership, or 
any other legal entity. 
(2) Completion of construction for the purposes of this act shall 
mean the date of issuance of a certificate of substantial completion by the 
owner, architect, engineer or other agents, or the date of the owner's use 
or possession of the improvement on real property. 
The limitation imposed by this provision shall not apply to any person 
in actual possession and control as owner, tenant or otherwise, of the im-
provement at the time the defective and unsafe condition of such improve-
ment constitutes the proximate cause of the injury for which it is proposed 
to bring an action. 
This provision shall not be construed as extending or limiting the peri-
ods otherwise prescribed by the laws of this state for the bringing of any 
action. 
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 78-
What s ta tu te of l imita t ions governs ac- proper performance of work b y I 
tion by contractoo for defective or im- building contractor, 1 A. L. R. 3d 9J 
78-12-26. Within three years.—Within three years : 
(1) An action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real prop 
provided, that when waste or trespass is committed by means of u 
ground works upon any mining claim, the cause of action shall n< 
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved par ty o 
facts constituting such waste or trespass. 
(2) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal prop 
including actions for specific recovery thereof; provided, that in all < 
where the subject of the action is a domestic animal usually includ* 
the term "livestock," having upon it at the time of its loss a reco 
mark or brand, if such animal had strayed or was stolen from the 
owner without his fault, the cause shall not be deemed to have ace 
until the owner has actual knowledge of such facts as would p 
reasonable man upon inquiry as to the possession thereof by the defenc 
(3) An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; but 
cause of action in such case shall not be deemed to have accrued l 
the discovery by the aggrieved par ty of the facts constituting the fi 
or mistake. 
(4) An action for a liability created by the statutes of this state, o 
than for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except w 
in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by the statutes of 
state. 
His tory : L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; O. 1943, providing t h a t pr ivate proper ty shall 
Supp., 104-12-26. be damaged for public use without 
pensation, and action to recover 
Compiler's Notes. damages was not governed by predec< 
This section, wi th the exception of subd. to this section bu t by l imitat ion on a d 
(4) which has been added, is identical for relief not otherwise provided 
to former section 104-2-24 (Code 1943) Webber v. Sal t Lake City, 40 U. 221, 
which was repealed by Laws 1951, ch. P . 503, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1115. 
58, § 3. Subdivision (1) of this section did 
Subdivision (4) of this section is identi- govern action by landowner for com 
cal in substance to former section 104-2- sation for t ak ing his land wi thout 
24.10 (Code 1943) which was repealed by consent and without condemnation 
Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. ceedings by rai lroad company. Sal t I 
Inv . Co. v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. 
Cross-References. u . 203, 148 P . 439, affd. 246 U. S. 446 
"Act ion" includes special proceeding, L. Ed. 823, 38 S. Ct. 348, applying for 
78-12-46.
 # # s t a tu te . 
Product Liabi l i ty Act, s t a tu te of limita- Action for damages to plaintiff's li 
t ions, 78-15-3. duo to coment, dust and smoko oma 
,
 v , , , a , . , , ing from defendant 's cement plant , 
Subdivision (1)—held inappHcable.
 n o t b a r r e d w h e r e b r o u g h t t e n y e a r s a 
Action against rai l road for damages p lant ' s commencement of oDeratinrr if 
t o Dlaintiff '* T>mrK>r+v K r^ -Io~ ~* — . „ - . : - -
w - i - - . V J L V i U v/VJ.TJLJ.TJLJLJAVV-'A.n.JLI \J\JXJS2J 
property or an insurable interest in the goods; and if the goods 
have been destroyed or converted a right of action is also in the 
par ty who either bore the risk of loss under the contract for sale 
or has since the injury assumed that risk as against the other; 
(b) if at the time of the injury the party plaintiff did not bear the risk 
of loss as against the other par ty to the contract for sale and there 
is no arrangement between them for disposition of the recovery, 
his suit or settlement is, subject to his own interest, as a fiduciary 
for the other par ty to the contract; 
(c) either par ty may with the consent of the other sue for the benefit 
of whom it may concern. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-722. CoUateral References. 
Sales<§=>224, 232. 
77 C.J.S. Sales § 285. 
70A-2-723. Proof of market price—Time and place.—(1) If an action 
ised on anticipatory repudiation comes to trial before the time for per-
>rmance with respect to some or all of the goods, any damages based on 
arket price (section 70A-2-708 or section 70A-2-713) shall be determined 
wording to the price of such goods prevailing at the time when the ag-
*ieved party learned of the repudiation. 
(2) If evidence of a price prevailing at the times or places described 
this chapter is not readily available the price prevailing within any rea-
nable time before or after the time described or at any other place which 
commercial judgment or under usage of trade would serve as a reasona-
e substitute for the one described may be used, making any proper allow-
lce for the cost of transporting the goods to or from such other place. 
(3) Evidence of a relevant price prevailing at a time or place other 
an the one described in this chapter offered by one party is not admissible 
lless and until he has given the other party such notice as the court finds 
fficient to prevent unfair surprise. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-723. Collateral References. 
Sales<&=>384(2), 418(2). 
78 C.J.S. Sales §§ 484, 546. 
70A-2-724. Admissibility of market quotations.—"Whenever the prevail-
g price or value of any goods regularly bought and sold in any established 
mmodity market is in issue, reports in official publications or trade jour-
Is or in newspapers or periodicals of general circulation published as the 
ports of such market shall be admissible in evidence. The circumstances 
the preparation of such a report may be shown to affect its weight but 
it its admissibility. 
Elistory: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-724. Collateral References. 
Evidence<§=>361. 
32 C.J.S. Evidence § 724. 
70A-2-725. Statute of limitations in contracts for sale.—(1) An action 
SALES 70A-2-72 
may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may nc 
extend it. 
(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of th 
aggrieved party 's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warrant 
occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty ei 
plicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of th 
breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrue 
when the breach is or should have been discovered. 
(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsectioj 
(1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action fo 
the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiratioi 
of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the firs 
action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance OJ 
from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute. 
(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limi 
tations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this 
act becomes effective. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 154, § 2-725. Collateral References. 
Sales<3=>394, 409. 
78 C.J.S. Sales §§ 505, 524. 
(The next section number is 70A-3-101) 
CHAPTER 3 
COMMEECIAL PAPER 
Part 1. Short Title, Form and Interpretation 
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70A-3-113. Seal. 
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70A-3-122. Accrual of cause of action. 
Part 2. Transfer and Negotiation 
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RAYMOND M. BERRY 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BILLIE and BEVERLY COTTLE, 
dba B & B PLAZA, INC., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
LEGRAND JOHNSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND DISMISSAL 
WIOJH PREJUDICE 
CiMil No. 24,518 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss came on for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on Monday, June 2, 19 86, Honorable VeNoy 
Christoffersen, District Judge presiding; the Court having 
„ considered the Affidavits of the parties and the memoranda of 
the parties and having found the plaintiffs did not institute 
their action until after seven (7) years after the sale of the 
concrete and delivery of the same to the site and otherwise 
being fully advised in the premises, 
NOW, THEREFORE, judgment is entered in favor of the 
Defendant, that plaintiffs take nothing, and that the action be 
Number ^</5T//-/</ 
I , (> . ; • 414 
a e o JUN1GI986 




is / (r -^  day olf June, 1 986, 
BY THE CO 
VENOY CHRISTAFFERS E/, District Judge 
/ 
BUih (JJ '-V.L415' -2-
